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I. INTRODUCTION

This Essay in honor of the memory of my dear friend and coauthor, Roger Goebel, presents a cutting-edge issue of
extraterritoriality. May the law of one jurisdiction, whose competition
law reaches a set of practices that may be anticompetitive, also reach
wholly offshore conduct that is part of the same strategy? Does it matter
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that the conduct is not implemented in the jurisdiction, and its
prospective territorial effects are derivative from its effects on the
world market? This question was before the Court of Justice of the
European Union in the now famous case, Intel Corp. v. Commission
(“Intel”). 1
The Court in Intel examined two alternative jurisdictional 2 bases,
each reflecting a theory of the case: (1) was the impugned conduct
implemented in the European Economic Area (“EEA”)? 3; and (2) did
the conduct have qualified effects (foreseeably substantial and
immediate) in the EEA? Despite the words of the Court of Justice of
the European Union which presume to apply the qualified effects test,
I conclude that the Court applied a third test—a “qualified effects
extension” for ancillary, directly related conduct. Was application of
the third test appropriate?
II. THE INTEL CASE
Intel, an American company, was the dominant supplier of a
critical chip in laptop computers and notebooks; it held approximately
seventy percent of the European market in the ten year period during
which its conduct was examined by the European Commission. 4 Its
only significant competitor was AMD, also an American company.
AMD finally developed a superior chip, and Intel went into action to
derail it. Intel implemented two sets of strategies. One was to offer its
significant customers loyalty rebates that had the effect of exclusivity
1. Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v European Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=4BD0BE51134530A8C90EA42
A507D7621?text=&docid=194082&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=1&cid=11710678 [https://perma.cc/W75S-BF77] [hereinafter CJEU judgment].
2. I treat the words “reach-of-the-law” and “jurisdictional” interchangeably, although the
two concepts can have different procedural consequences.
3. The EEA links the European Union with the member states of the European Free Trade
Area, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. It allows these states to participate in the internal
market on the basis of adopting the law and principles of the internal market. See European
Economic Area (EEA), EUROPA (Feb. 5, 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/
european-economic-area-eea/348/european-economic-area-eea_en [https://perma.cc/2YMG4S2M].
4. Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547, ¶ 25,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=153543&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11713196
[https://perma.cc/89PS56X3], revs’d on other grounds, Case C-413/14 P [2017], http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=198941&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=11714117 [https://perma.cc/7NN8-J9TB] [hereinafter General Court
judgment].
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with Intel; these were called exclusivity rebates. The other was, as the
court called them, naked restraints. For Intel’s big customers who had
already signed on with AMD to buy its new chip, Intel made an offer
they could not refuse: Breach your contract with AMD and return to
the Intel fold; Intel will pay you well to do so. Typically, Intel paid its
unfaithful customers to forsake the AMD chip for six months, a critical
period for traction for the new product. 5
As for most of the naked restraints and exclusivity rebates that
constituted the European Commission’s abuse of dominance case
against Intel, the conduct unarguably had sufficient links to the
European Union or the EEA and Intel did not contest jurisdiction. But
the links were more tenuous in the Intel-Lenovo episode. Intel’s
customer, Lenovo, was a Chinese firm. The chip sales implicated were
between Intel in Silicon Valley and Lenovo in Beijing. The finished
products, computers assembled by Lenovo in Beijing, were sold from
Beijing to the world. The computers implicated (those that would have
incorporated an AMD chip had Intel not induced the breach of contract)
were relatively few—a few thousand. They accounted for a small share
of the world market for the chips, and it was not clear if and how many
of them reached the EEA. Additionally, Intel and AMD were, of
course, American firms. Not initially but on its first appeal, Intel
challenged the European Union’s jurisdiction over the Lenovo episode.
Did EU law properly reach it? To answer this question, we consider the
language of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”), 6 the requirements of public international law, the EU case
law, the reasoning of the EU jurists, and policy.
The first touchstone for considering the reach of EU competition
law is the Treaty provision concerned. Article 102 of the TFEU
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position “within the internal market
or in a substantial portion of it . . . .” 7 The second touchstone is public
international law, which disallows assertion of jurisdiction where it
would unreasonably interfere with the laws or policy of another
sovereign state. The occurrence of foreseeably substantial and
5. See Cyrus Farivar & Andrew Cunningham, The rise and fall of AMD: How an underdog
stuck it to Intel, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 21, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2013/04/the-rise-and-fall-of-amd-how-an-underdog-stuck-it-to-intel/
[https://perma.cc/KS82-CK6C]; Intel, T-286/09, ¶¶ 129-34, 198-220.
6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102,
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326/47) [hereinafter TFEU].
7. Id.
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immediate effects in the territory is a recognized basis for jurisdiction. 8
The third is the Court of Justice case law. The principal judgment is A.
Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. Commission (“Wood pulp”), 9 a case involving
price-fixing outside of the European Union of goods sold directly to
EU buyers. The Wood pulp Court interpreted the Treaty to reach the
offshore price-fixing on grounds that the conspiracy was implemented
in the European Union.
Intel argued that the words of Article 102 TFEU 10 require that the
abusive acts take place within the internal market. Intel further argued,
under Wood pulp, that the Intel-Lenovo acts were not implemented in
the internal market. Further, it argued that EU law did not have an
effects test. Finally, it contended that even if the European Union did
have an effects test, the test was not met because any foreseeable
European effects of Intel’s dealings with Lenovo were insubstantial
and not immediate. 11
The Commission found liability at a point in time before Intel
asserted lack of jurisdiction. 12 On Intel’s appeal, in addition to its
substantive holdings, the General Court found that the jurisdictional
requirements were met on grounds of both implementation and
qualified effects. It saw Intel’s conduct as a single and continuous
infringement. It found that Intel’s conduct had an immediate effect on
Lenovo’s conduct and was part of an overall strategy with effects on
the entire world market including the EEA. Again, Intel appealed.
The Advocate General, Nils Wahl, deemed the General Court’s
analysis flawed. Contrary to the General Court, Wahl concluded that
Intel did not implement the Lenovo-related conduct within the internal
European market. 13 The Advocate General urged the Court of Justice
8. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, FOURTH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§
401-13 (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
9. Joined Cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, C-125/85, C-126/85,
C-127/85, C-128/85 & C-129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. Commission of the European
Communities (“Wood pulp”), 1994 E.C.R. I-00099. The Court observed that the place of
implementation of the anticompetitive agreement is more important than where an agreement
was made, lest price-fixers easily evade liability rule.
10. “Abuse within the internal market” may be contrasted with the words of Article 101,
which condemns anticompetitive agreements with the object or effect within the EU or EEA.
11. General Court judgment ¶¶ 221-28.
12. Id. ¶ 246.
13. Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v European Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 307-14,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=198941&page
Index=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11714117 [https://perma.cc/
7NN8-J9TB] [hereinafter Advocate General opinion].
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to explicitly adopt the qualified effects test, 14 but concluded that the
General Court misapplied the qualified effects test in any event. 15 It
was not enough that Intel’s conduct had a direct and immediate effect
on Lenovo’s conduct regarding Lenovo’s purchase of chips, nor that
the Intel-Lenovo episode was part of a general strategy that had
sufficient effects in the EEA. Rather, the Commission had the
obligation to prove that Intel’s Lenovo-related conduct had foreseeably
direct and immediate anticompetitive effects in the internal market. The
claim that it had such effects appeared “hypothetical, speculative and
unsubstantiated.” 16 But, “it [could not] be ruled out that the Lenovo
agreements could have had a significant impact on AMD’s continuous
capacity to develop, manufacture and market computer processing
units (“CPUs”) worldwide, including in the EEA.” 17 “[T]he General
Court should have asked: could those agreements immediately or
directly diminish Intel’s competitors’ ability to compete for x86 CPUs
within the internal market.” 18 The General Court made no such analysis
and this key question, which could have revealed the substantiality and
immediacy of the effects in the EEA, went unanswered. 19
After the thorough and thoughtful opinion by the Advocate
General on extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court of Justice wrote a thin
judgment on the point. 20 The Court summarily rejected as unfounded
all of Intel’s grounds of appeal in the space of a mere two pages. The
Court held first (as it backed into an implicit holding that EU law
accepts the qualified effects test) that the qualified effects test pursues
the same objective as the implementation test: preventing conduct that
has anticompetitive effects likely to impact the EU market. 21 Implicitly,
EU competition law must be copious enough to prevent its evasion by
14. Id. ¶ 296.
15. Id. ¶¶ 320-26.
16. Id. ¶ 324.
17. Id. ¶ 325.
18. Id. ¶ 322.
19. Advocate General Wahl advocated caution and restraint. He said:
I consider it to be particularly important that jurisdiction is asserted with restraint in
relation to behavior that has not, strictly speaking, taken place within the territory of
the European Union . . . [I]t is only with a great deal of caution that the effect of the
conduct complained of can be used as the yardstick for asserting jurisdiction. That is
all the more important today [in a world of more than 100 competition authorities].
Id. ¶ 300.
20. Admittedly, the Court had to resolve major substantive issues going to the heart of
Article 102 that may have overwhelmed the jurisdictional point.
21. CJEU judgment ¶ 45.
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firms doing culpable acts offshore. Second, the court held that public
international law allows jurisdiction “when it is foreseeable that the
conduct in question will have an immediate and substantial effect in the
European Union.” 22
Regarding foreseeability of immediate effects, the Court said:
“[I]t is sufficient to take account of the probable effects of conduct on
competition in order for the foreseeability criterion to be satisfied.”23
Further, “Intel’s conduct vis-à-vis Lenovo formed part of an overall
strategy intended to ensure that no Lenovo notebook equipped with an
AMD CPU would be available on the market, including in the EEA
….” 24 Thus, “the General Court did not err in considering … that Intel’s
conduct was capable of producing an immediate effect in the EEA.” 25
As to substantiality, the Court said: “It suffices … that the General
Court held that Intel’s conduct vis-à-vis Lenovo formed part of an
overall strategy aimed at foreclosing AMD’s access to the most
important sales channels .…” 26 “[F]aced with [such] … strategy …, it
was appropriate to take into consideration the conduct of the
undertaking viewed as a whole in order to assess the substantial nature
of its effects on the market of the EU and of the EEA.” 27 “[T]o do
otherwise would lead to an artificial fragmentation of comprehensive
anticompetitive conduct, capable of affecting the market structure
within the EEA, into a collection of separate forms of conduct which
might escape the European Union’s jurisdiction.” 28
The brief, uncomplicated Court of Justice judgment contrasts with
the cautious opinion of the Advocate General. The Advocate General
presented a challenge. The Intel appeal, he said, “will enable the Court
to fine-tune [the] line of case-law [on extraterritorial jurisdiction] and
adjust it to present day conditions, characterized by global economies,
integrated marketplaces and elaborate patterns of trade.” 29 The Court
side-stepped the challenge.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. ¶ 49 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 51.
Id. ¶ 52.
Id.
Id. ¶ 55.
Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶ 57.
Advocate General opinion ¶ 280.
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III. WHO WAS RIGHT?
1. The Wording of Article 102
Article 101 prohibits anticompetitive agreements with a distortive
“object or effect” “within the internal market.” 30 Article 102 prohibits
“an abuse” “within the internal market.” 31 Do these phrases and their
differences mean that the Treaty can catch anticompetitive agreements
launched offshore (that may have an effect in the internal market) but
cannot catch abuses of dominance launched offshore because the
Treaty prohibits abuses only if they are within the internal market?
Advocate General Wahl properly answered “no,” 32 and the Court of
Justice agreed. 33 The difference in the language of the two articles was
surely fortuitous. The court rightly construed the Treaty language not
to stand in the way of an appropriate reach of the law to abusive conduct
from abroad.
2. Was Intel’s Lenovo-related conduct implemented in the internal
market?
The General Court, referencing Lenovo’s acts, said “yes.”
Advocate General Wahl, referencing Intel’s acts, said “no.” All Intel
did was shift Lenovo’s future purchases (in China) from American chip
rival AMD back to itself. Intel did not sell products to Lenovo in the
EEA.
The Advocate General is correct. It is a stretch to characterize
Intel’s conduct in Silicon Valley, and agreements to sell chips from
Silicon Valley to Beijing to be assembled in computers in China and
shipped from China to the world, as abusive behavior implemented in
the EEA.
But the European Commission and the General Court have
already stretched the natural meaning of “implementation.” An
example is the merger of Gencor and Lonrho, 34 leading platinum firms
in South Africa. The merger threatened anticompetitive effects in the
30. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 101 (emphasis added).
31. TFEU, supra note 6 (emphasis added).
32. Advocate General opinion ¶¶ 288-89.
33. CJEU judgment ¶¶ 42-46.
34. Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v Comm’n of the European Communities, 1999 E.C.R.
II-00753 [hereinafter Gencor/Lonrho]. See ELEANOR M. FOX & DANIEL A. CRANE, GLOBAL
ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW 394-97 (West 2d. ed. 2017) [hereinafter FOX &
CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES].
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world, of which the European Union was the third biggest buying
market after the United States and Japan. 35 The General Court affirmed
the European Commission’s finding that the merger was implemented
in the European Union and was covered by the EU Merger Control
Regulation. 36 It was a fact that Lonrho had sales offices in the European
Union 37 (although the harmful effects would have been felt in the
European Union just as surely if Lonrho had no sales offices there).
The judgment and its general acceptance in the European Union caused
observers to conclude (before the Intel case), that for practical purposes
the European Union had an effects test. 38 A version of the effects
doctrine is widely accepted in the world, and is particularly evident
with regard to multinational mergers whose effects are felt around the
world. 39 It is considered fair game for any nation within whose borders
anticompetitive effects of a merger may be felt to examine the merger
and impose remedies to alleviate the anticompetitive harm in the
nation. 40
3. Does the European Union Have or Should It Adopt an Effects Test?
The General Court thought that the European Union already had
a qualified effects test. The Advocate General observed that the issue
was unresolved but thought it important for the European Union to have
an effects test. He invited the court to adopt one and give guidance as
to its parameters. 41 The Court of Justice treated the question as a nonissue, stating merely that “the qualified effects test pursues the same
objective [as the implementation test], namely preventing conduct
which, while not adopted within the EU, has anticompetitive effects

35. See Gencor/Lonrho ¶ 60.
36. Id. ¶¶ 68-69, 87-88.
37. Id. ¶ 69.
38. See Luca Prete, On Implementation and Effects: The Recent Case-law on the
Territorial (or Extraterritorial?) Application of EU Competition Rules, 9 J. OF EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 492, 493 (2018).
39. See FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES, supra note 34, at 1-2, 5, 21-24, 570.
40. Typically, one or both merging firms do some significant business in the regulating
state. A significant stream of revenues into the jurisdiction justifies premerger notification
requirements and thus premerger vetting with a view towards clearance or remedies. See
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER
NOTIFICATION AND REVIEW PROCEDURES, NEXUS TO REVIEWING JURISDICTION (2018)
available at https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
MWG_NPRecPractices2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPK7-ZNYK].
41. See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp., supra note 13.
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liable to have an impact on the EU market.” 42 Moreover, the court said,
the test is “justified under public international law when it is
foreseeable that the conduct in question will have an immediate and
substantial effect in the European Union.” 43 Thus, it is now clear that
the European Union has a qualified effects test.
Of the three sources—the General Court judgment, the Advocate
General’s opinion, and the Court of Justice judgment—the Advocate
General’s opinion was the truest to the state of the law on
implementation and on effects jurisdiction, and the most transparent.
4. Under the Qualified Effects Test, Does EU Law on Abuse of
Dominance Reach Intel’s Lenovo-Related Conduct?
This was the key question. Did or would the United States-toChina conduct have foreseeably immediate and substantial effects
within the EEA?
As we saw, the General Court said “yes.” 44 It found the effects
immediate because no Lenovo notebook incorporating an x86 CPU
produced by an Intel competitor was available anywhere in the world
including the EEA. This was foreseeable and intended. Moreover, the
effects were substantial because the conduct was part of a single and
continuous infringement, the General Court said, and presumably the
other parts of the continuous infringement were substantiated. 45
The Advocate General disagreed with the reasoning, as noted. The
Court of Justice upheld the General Court in broad strokes and simply
did not engage with Wahl’s analysis. The Court pulled the Lenovo
episode up by its metaphorical bootstraps, characterizing its European
effects as substantial merely by bundling the episode with the conduct
that underpinned the rest of the case. The Court thus maneuvered
around and assumed away the question of the Lenovo’s episode effects
in the EEA.
Which is the better approach? We begin a discussion of this issue
by asking, first, why we have jurisdictional limits—a question not even
referenced by the Court of Justice. Second, we ask why we might want
and to some extent need a significant outreach to condemn
anticompetitive offshore acts. Third, we ask, is there a reasonable
42.
43.
44.
45.

CJEU judgment ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 49.
General Court judgment ¶ 250 et seq.
Id. ¶¶ 260-90.

990

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:3

reconciliation of the two motivations—the need for limits and the need
for breadth?
Why jurisdictional limits? Reading the Court of Justice judgment,
one might lose sight of the fact that there are jurisdictional limits. The
reasons are first, that outreach threatens jurisdictional clash, in which
legitimate interests of one nation clash with legitimate interests of
another; and second, that outreach threatens to undermine certainty of
business.
Let us first consider business certainty. The interest of business to
avoid overlap of laws is a credible claim but a contingent one. Different
jurisdictions have different laws and their laws have different nuances.
This is a fact of life. A world competition regime was proposed in the
1990s, and before that in the 1940s, but the nations did not adopt such
an international law of competition and we are left with a multiplicity
of laws. 46 In the absence of an international law of competition,
business must live with and adjust to diversity. There are on-going
robust attempts at convergence of national laws among the competition
authorities of the world, and this project helps to minimize
differences; 47 but it doesn’t eliminate them.
Second, systems clash, pitting one jurisdiction’s norms against
another’s. One jurisdiction may invade the interests of another, even if
it cannot help but do so as it protects its own legitimate interests.
Antitrust clashes happen less and less frequently as legal principles
increasingly converge. In some spheres, significant convergence has
been achieved. Cartel law is first among converged national rules. 48 In
such areas of consensus, we need worry less about systems clash
caused by enforcement outreach, even while we continue to develop

46. See ELEANOR M. FOX, ANTITRUST WITHOUT BORDERS: FROM ROOTS TO CODES TO
NETWORKS (2015), available at http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15Competition-Fox-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NVF-RA43].
47. See
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK,
http://www.international
competitionnetwork.org [https://perma.cc/M42E-B447]; see also THE INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN: ORIGINS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ASPIRATIONS (Paul
Lugard ed. 2011).
48. Establishment of the strong national rules against cartels has the felicitous by-product
effect of keeping the global commons free of cartels. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Motorola Mobility: How Far Should A
Nation’s Law Reach, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Oct. 2018) [hereinafter Fox, Motorola
Mobility]; Eleanor M. Fox, China, Export Cartels, and Vitamin C: America Second?,
COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Fox, America Second?].
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norms and procedures to avoid conflicting remedies, including double
counting of damages. 49
But there are also spheres of substantive divergence. Abuse of
dominance is first among them. One nation’s (view of) abusive conduct
is sometimes another nation’s (view of) pro-competitive conduct.50
Conflicting substantive appreciations as to what conduct is
anticompetitive might counsel sensitivity to outreach of national law in
this area, which the Intel case potentially inhabits. What EU law calls
anticompetitive exclusionary conduct US law might call a
procompetitive response to competition by a rival. US authorities might
characterize the EU condemnation as chilling the competition of an
inventive firm and reducing its incentives to invent. 51
But why then might policy (sometimes) call for a wide outreach
to offshore acts? Increasingly, the conduct that anticompetitively harms
a nation takes place offshore. 52 Sometimes the line from the conduct’s
launch to the victim’s harm is not perfectly direct, but it is an
unwavering line nonetheless. The conduct might be a step or two
removed from the market harm, 53 but the arrow is set in motion and
inexorably will reach its target. Cartels of components in nation A,
assembled into final products in nation B, that reach foreseeable
consumers in nation C are a prime example. 54 The offending conduct
is a consensus wrong, and unless the victims or their state call the
violators to account, the conduct may go unpunished, and the cartels
will proliferate despite their near universal condemnation. 55 Abuses of
dominance travel across borders, too. A nation beset by antitrust harm

49. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 47.
50. See Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance: Why Europe Is
Different, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 129 (2014) [hereinafter Fox, Why Europe Is Different].
Compare Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013), with Microsoft Corp.
v. United States, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). There is a divergence of appreciation of what is
anticompetitive even in the United States. There is a similar debate in the European Union.
51. See Fox, Why Europe Is Different, supra note 50. Compare Novell, Inc., 731 F.3d 1064
with Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34.
52. See FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES, supra note 34, ch. 8 at 527-74.
53. Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality and Input Cartels: Life in the Global Value Lane—
The Collision Course with Empagran and How to Avert It, 9 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1
(2014) [hereinafter Fox, Extraterrioriality].
54. Id.
55. See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and the Clash of Sovereigns, in 2 DOUGLAS GINSBURG
LIBER AMICORUM: AN ANTITRUST PROFESSOR ON THE BENCH (forthcoming 2019); Fox,
Extraterritoriality, supra note 53.
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has, in general, the right to apply its usual standards to condemn the
conduct that is launched abroad. 56
The two options—to condemn, or to keep hands off—cut in
opposite policy directions. Is there a rule of reconciliation?
An often applied rule of thumb helps to bring the two motivations
into sympathy. The offshore conduct must cause or be reasonably likely
to cause antitrust harm in the enforcing jurisdiction and to do so
reasonably directly, and remedies should not be disproportionate to the
territorial harm. 57 Proof of this connectivity is not an onerous
requirement. But the requirement should be taken seriously especially
in the case of divergent substantive norms. That is why, in applying the
qualified effects test, Advocate General Wahl was correct. The General
Court should have asked whether Intel’s Lenovo-relevant conduct was
likely to “diminish Intel’s [only] competitor’s ability to compete . . .
within the [European] internal market.” 58
IV. THE THIRD TEST
The Court of Justice purported to apply the qualified effects test.
But did it? There seemed to have been no fact-finding to support a
conclusion that Intel’s agreements with Lenovo had foreseeable
immediate and substantial effects in the EEA. The hidden holding of
the case is: where offshore conduct not directly implemented in the
EEA and potentially, although not immediately, 59 affecting the EEA is
an integral part of a strategy covered by EU law, EU law covers the
conduct. “[T]o [exclude the conduct] would lead to an artificial
fragmentation of comprehensive anticompetitive conduct capable of
affecting the market structure within the EEA, into a collection of

56. See FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES, supra note 34, at 527-74.
57. See US DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND COOPERATION § 3 (2017).
58. Advocate General opinion ¶ 322.
59. The Court does not concede that the effect may not be immediate. The Court says the
conduct “was capable of producing an immediate effect in the EEA.” CJEU judgment ¶ 52. If
“immediate” means “immediate,” the conclusion is doubtful. At least one US court has given
the US counterpart adjective, “direct,” a pragmatic meaning so that less work is required of
“directness” where substantial effects are clearly foreseeable. The clause “direct, substantial and
foreseeable” is given an interdependent and iterative meaning. Minn-Chem, Inc., 683 F.3d at
845. If the extraterritoriality jurisprudence is to be modernized to fit the globalized world, this
approach may be necessary.
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separate forms of conduct which might escape the European Union’s
jurisdiction.” 60
Is this “qualified effects extension” a wise and appropriate basis
for laws’ reach?
There are five reasons to give an affirmative answer, and there are
five reasons to give a negative answer. First, I state the reasons
supporting the flexibility.
First, as background, the conservative inclination (the
presumption against extraterritoriality) was devised in an era before
globalization when economic issues were truly a two-sovereign
“game.” Cross-border transactions were not predominant. Norms in
favor of more liberal trade as developed in the GATT and WTO were
only nascent. There was no recognition of mutual as well as global
gains in both economic welfare and peace by community-minded
thinking. Moreover, few countries had antitrust laws and fewer had
competition cultures. We are living in a different era. More than 130
countries have competition laws, and they have or are developing
competition cultures, and most recognize the global benefits of
restraining anticompetitive conduct. 61 Strategies enabled by new
technologies have transnational if not global effects; multinational
corporations are bigger than nations and can play national regimes off
against one another; and strategic economic behavior to avoid
regulation or put costs on foreigners is disfavored in the world trading
system because it harms people as consumers, firms competing on the
merits, and global welfare. 62 In this altered world marketplace, the
presumption against extraterritoriality for economic law in defense of
markets is no longer appropriate. 63 We need to deal with the reason
behind the presumption: to prevent clashes caused by one sovereign’s
unreasonable intrusion on another sovereign’s legitimate interests, and
to tailor the law of restraint to the reasons for it. Since general retreat
and withdrawal from antitrust enforcement against non-nationals and
foreign-based acts would deeply undermine the global and national
competition systems, it is fitting to stress modes for accommodation
more than rules for retreat.

60. CJEU judgment ¶ 57.
61. FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES, supra note 34, ch. 8 at 1-2.
62. See Fox, America Second?, supra note 48.
63. As noted, there is no longer a presumption against national laws’ reaching offshore
conduct that is directly targeted at, and harms, the enforcing nation.
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Second, which is a subset of the first, strategies of multinational
firms are commonly global, and different functions, such as
manufacturing components, assembling finished products, and
distributing the finished products, commonly take place in different
countries. In the absence of an international law of antitrust, unless a
jurisdiction can examine the full scope of a market problem,
transactions harmful to the jurisdiction and the world will fall through
the yawning cracks between our far-from-seamless 130 antitrust laws.
Third, Intel’s strategy had precisely the characteristics that
counsel a broader outreach of the law. The market was a world market
and was highly concentrated, affecting computer users worldwide. The
strategy was global—to suppress the new invention of the only
significant competitor/supplier of a critical input into computers. EU
law clearly applied to core acts comprising the strategy. The conduct
radiated out from its core to wherever Intel had significant customers
who would be tempted by rival AMD’s new invention. The IntelLenovo episode was part of the unitary strategy challenged by the
European Commission, even though its geographic locus was entirely
offshore and the target market was global, not specifically the European
Union. As the Court observed, shaving off this episode would
artificially fragment holistic conduct. 64
Fourth, grappling with the possibility that jurisdiction over the
episode could interfere with legitimate interests of another sovereign,
here, the United States, home of Intel, 65 we ask two questions: first,
was there a direct conflict with the law of the United States, in the sense
of the case Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California (“Hartford Fire”)66?
That is, was it impossible for Intel to comply with the laws of both
jurisdictions at the same time? The answer is no. Second, was the EU
enforcement in tension with US law or policy in a softer sense, as in F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (“Empagran”)? 67 For
64. CJEU judgment ¶¶ 50, 56-57.
65. What are the legitimate interests of the United States? The United States has a
legitimate interest in common with the EU: maintaining a competitive market for the good of
consumers and other market players by proscribing anticompetitive abuses of dominant power.
Does it have a legitimate interest in protecting its national champion? It is an accepted norm,
vigorously urged by the United States, that antitrust law does not protect national champions.
But if EU competition law should be nationalistic and apply its competition law to handicap the
efficiencies of US firms (which is sometimes charged but adamantly denied), the US would have
a role in calling out the need to protect efficient competition.
66. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 (1993).
67. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168 (2004).
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example, does US antitrust law promote the Intel conduct, deeming it
a permissible and even virtuous way to compete? The answer is not
clear. The US FTC consent order against Intel 68 supports a negative
answer, although incumbent-firm-leaning Supreme Court decisions
would lend support to an affirmative answer: US law may encourage
what EU law prohibits. 69
Fifth is a proposition rather than a reason: with the other elements
present, as above, 70 the fact of conflicting jurisprudence and debate in
a defendant’s home country should not defeat outreach by a state
enforcing its law non-discriminatorily to satisfy an antitrust interest
likely to affect its territory. 71 Reasonable accommodation can be made
at the remedy stage.
We turn to five reasons that could lead one to reject the qualified
effects extension. First, the commonly applied rule of law on
extraterritoriality requires that the impugned conduct have an
immediate, substantial, and foreseeable effect in the enforcing
jurisdiction. 72 Second, the test makes good policy sense; namely, to
minimize conflicts, to avoid encroaching on the interests of other
sovereigns, to avoid creating uncertainty for business firms and an
increased risk of conflicting rules, and to further good administration.
Good administration would entail avoiding control over conduct in

68. See Matter of Intel Corporation, F.T.C. Docket No. 9341 (Nov. 2, 2010) (consent
order), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/08/100804inteldo_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NP8X-P4MS].
69. See Verizon Commc’n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004);
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’n, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). For a circuit court opinion
written by now Supreme Court Justice Gorsuch, see Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d
1064 (10th Cir. 2013).
70. This would be especially true where the home country did not complain about the
exercise of jurisdiction. Compare Gencor/Lonrho, where South Africa expressed its view that
the merger of the two South African firms was not anticompetitive and that the merger was good
for South Africa, but it did not complain about the EU prohibition. See FOX & CRANE, GLOBAL
ISSUES, supra note 34, at 394-97. In Wood pulp, the United States not only did not complain
about the European Union’s suit against an American export cartel authorized under the Webb
Pomerene Act but in effect told the European officials: if this is a cartel into your jurisdiction,
prosecute it. See Wood pulp, supra note 9.
71. Similar debate exists on the same point of law within the EU. Moreover, the
Commission’s decision is appealable through the European system. Indeed, in Intel itself, the
Court of Justice reversed and remanded the judgment of the General Court that upheld the
decision of the Commission. See CJEU judgment ¶ 148.
72. See US DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 57.
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which the regulating nation has no interest. 73 Third, international law
requires no less. The territorial test with its limited extraterritorial reach
stabilizes the international order. For all that may be said and desired
about a cosmopolitan vision of world community, it is not the law. It
has not been bargained for by the nations and is not the customary law
of nations. 74 Indeed, the current modus operandi, for better or worse, is
nationalistic, not cosmopolitan.
Fourth, the state of globalization in the world and the constant
emergence of new technologies that cross borders are reasons for, not
against, limits to national law. Firms constrained by a hundred
sovereigns cannot be as inventive as firms with one governmental
master. With an increasing application of nations’ antitrust laws to
successful global firms, innovation will decline and consumers and the
world will be worse off. 75
Fifth, Intel’s challenged conduct is precisely in the area of the
greatest divergence of substantive antitrust law; namely, when are
single-firm strategies of dominant firms anticompetitive? US and EU
law conflict. 76 Especially in this area, it may be argued, jurisdictions
should not extend the reach of their laws; they should stay within their
bounds.
V. CONCLUSION
The two sets of arguments 77 are based on different world views of
community, political economy, power, and the purview of the state
versus the purview of the market. This writer is persuaded by the first
set. 78 This is so largely because the strategies referenced are global and

73. See Advocate General opinion ¶ 298-302; Luca Prete, On Implementation and Effects:
The Recent Case-law on the Territorial (or Extraterritorial?) Application of EU Competition
Rules, 9 J. OF EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 492, 493 (2018).
74. “Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed out of a sense of legal right or obligation.” RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 8, § 402, cmt. b.
75. This was one of defendant’s arguments in Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics
Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir.). But see Fox, Motorola Mobility, supra note 48.
76. See Fox, Why Europe is Different, supra note 50.
77. There are middle grounds. Analysts or policy-makers might accept some but not all of
the reasons and propositions on either side.
78. The question of the third way need not even have been reached if the General Court
had asked the Advocate General’s question and answered it in the affirmative: “[C]ould [the
Intel-Lenovo] agreements immediately or directly diminish Intel’s competitors’ ability to
compete for x86 CPUs chips within the internal market”; could they have had a significant
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the constituent pieces are synergistic. Moreover, a principle of
jurisdictional retreat would defang national laws in their mission to
control abuses of market power that would sanction harm to every
nation’s citizens by the largest firms in the world.

impact on AMD’s continuous capacity to develop, manufacture and market CPUs worldwide
including the EEA?
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